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Abstract 
The high success rate of Commission proposals seems to suggest that the European 
Commission is very influential in promoting European policies. However, the Commission’s 
agenda-setting activity might be affected by its anticipation of member states’ preferences. If 
the Commission acts with foresight, it simply does not initiate a proposal when it knows that 
the proposal will not be acceptable to member state governments in the Council or, more 
recently, the European Parliament. In this respect, the Commission is far less powerful than it 
appears. We test this hypothesis with aggregate data on the number of Commission proposals 
for directives and the degree of EU support in the Council between 1976 and 2003. The 
results of the analysis broadly support the theoretical argument. 
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The role of the Commission in the European integration process 
The power of the Commission to promote and shape the course of the integration process is 
one of the main unresolved questions in European integration research. For 
intergovernmentalists, the Commission is merely an agent of powerful member state 
interests. Its independent role is restricted to providing technically informed and politically 
neutral policy proposals, facilitating information exchange and brokering agreements 
between member states. In this view, the Commission is just an instrument of member states 
to attain their collectively best negotiation agreement (Moravcsik, 1993 p. 507). The 
Commission is a tool of member states to reach more efficient bargaining outcomes, but it 
has no independent effect on the content of those bargaining outcomes. 
In contrast, neo-functionalists and other supranationalists attribute substantial influence 
to supranational institutions in general, and to the European Commission in particular 
(Sandholtz and Stone Sweet, 1998 p. 4; Sandholtz and Zysman, 1989 p. 96; Stone Sweet and 
Brunell, 1998 p. 75). According to this view, the Commission’s right of initiative allows it to 
fuel and mould the integration process. The Commission’s superior expertise and knowledge 
in many policy areas provides it with an informational advantage that it can use to promote its 
own institutional interests in the decision-making process. Also, the Commission’s monopoly 
on drafting and initiating legislation allows it to set the broad parameters in which the 
subsequent political debates take place.  
Finally, the third theoretical perspective takes a more nuanced position between these 
two extremes. Rather than perceiving the Commission to be generally powerful or generally 
lacking, Institutionalists argue that the influence of the Commission and other supranational 
actors depends on the preference constellation among all powerful actors as well as the 
institutional environment (Pollack, 1997 pp. 121-24; Tallberg, 2000; Tsebelis and Garrett, 
2000, 2001). In this view, other actors with institutional powers to change or reject 
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Commission initiatives, like member states and the European Parliament (EP), act as 
constraints on the Commission’s power to shape and drive the integration process.  
In this paper, we study the legislative agenda-setting activity of the European 
Commission between 1976 and 2003. To shed more light on the relative distribution of power 
between the Commission and member states, we examine how responsive the Commission is 
to changes in member states’ attitudes towards European integration. Applying an 
institutionalist perspective, we expect that the Commission’s decision to initiate legislation 
crucially depends on the attitudes of member states in the Council. If the Commission 
anticipates that a proposal will be rejected in the Council or amended towards a less preferred 
policy than the status quo, the Commission will likely abstain from introducing such a 
proposal. By focusing on the Commission’s decision about whether or not to introduce a 
proposal, we study a largely neglected aspect of EU legislative decision-making.4 Most 
studies of the Commission’s agenda-setting power focus on cases in which negotiations took 
place and decisions were eventually made. In these contexts, researchers find that the 
Commission can have significant influence on the content of agreements, either by framing 
the debate or exploiting different majority coalitions (Boessen and Maarse, 2008; Elsig, 2007; 
Princen and Rhinard, 2006)5.  
While we do not dispute these findings, we argue that an exclusive focus on actual 
decision-making cases overlooks the arguably more fundamental question about the 
conditions under which the Commission decides to introduce a proposal in the first place. 
Only about one out of twenty proposals introduced by the Commission is not adopted by 
                                               
4
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member states6. At least two possible explanations can account for this very high adoption 
rate. A supranationalist explanation would stress the Commission’s resources and powers that 
allow it to ensure that almost every policy it desires will be adopted by the Council. In 
contrast, an institutionalist explanation would argue that the high adoption rate is due to a 
selection effect: the Commission appears successful because it only introduces those 
proposals that it knows to be broadly in line with the preferences of the required majority of 
member states. As Bachrach and Baratz have long pointed out, restricting the study of power 
to an examination of actors’ influence in actual decision-making cases distorts the analysis 
(Bachrach and Baratz, 1962). The ability to keep issues off the agenda is just as or even more 
important as the ability to influence policy outcomes once issues are debated in the political 
arena. Our study contributes to the literature on Commission agenda-setting and the debate 
about the relative influence of supranational actors and member states in the integration 
process by examining this more elusive aspect of power. 
In the next section, we first explicate the assumptions and the logic of the theoretical 
argument through a simple institutionalist model of the Commission’s proposal initiation 
decision. From this model, a testable hypothesis about the effect of changes in Council 
attitudes on the Commission’s legislative agenda-setting activity can be derived. Following 
the theory section, we discuss the research design, the operationalization of variables, and the 
data sources. The results of the analysis indicate that the Commission’s agenda-setting 
activity is indeed responsive to changes in member state’s attitudes towards European 
integration. The European Commission introduces more legislative proposals when the 
Council consists of mainly integrationist governments than when the Council consists of less 
integrationist governments. Although public support for European integration also increases 
the Commission’s agenda-setting activity, it does not render the relationship between agenda-
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setting activity and Council attitudes spurious. Finally, the increasing power of the EP, or any 
other institutional changes brought about through Treaty revisions, did not influence the 
Commission’s agenda-setting activity. 
Modelling the Commission’s proposal initiation decision 
To explicate the assumptions underlying our theoretical argument and demonstrate its logical 
consistency, we present a simple spatial model of the Commission’s proposal initiation 
decision. Spatial models have originally been developed to study political decision-making in 
the United States (e.g. Krehbiel, 1988). Subsequently, the same technical apparatus has been 
used to model legislative decision-making in the EU (e.g. Crombez, 1996; Steunenberg, 
1994; Tsebelis, 1994). In this context, it is important to note that the current model does not 
present novel ideas. The main insight about the agenda-setter’s behaviour resulting from the 
anticipation of the other actor’s actions has already been established by Romer and Rosenthal 
(1978) more than three decades ago.  
However, amongst the formal theories of EU decision-making, only Steunenberg’s 
(1994) theoretical account models the Commission’s decision about whether or not to 
introduce a proposal as the first move of the game.7 In line with the aim of Steunenberg’s 
model of predicting policy outcomes under different legislative procedures, his model is more 
complex than the model proposed here. In our model, we strip the latter parts of the 
legislative process down to their bare essentials in order to highlight the considerations made 
by the Commission at the beginning of the game when deciding about whether or not to 
introduce a proposal. In this way, the model represents the core of the theoretical argument, 
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while sidestepping debates about the powers and relative influence of different actors in the 
legislative process that are of secondary importance to our point.  
The model is strategic in nature, as the Commission is supposed to take the potential 
reactions of other powerful actors into account when making its decision. The model is a 
simplification of any actual decision-making situation but we hope to capture one of the most 
salient aspects affecting the Commission’s decision to introduce a proposal by stressing the 
role of member states in the Council and their preferences. For the moment, we do not 
consider the potential influence of the EP. After explicating the basic logic of the model, the 
consequences of including the EP as a co-legislator will be explored.  
The basic model consists of two stages: First, the Commission decides about whether or 
not to introduce a proposal. If the Commission refrains from introducing a proposal, the 
outcome is the current status quo policy. If the Commission introduces a proposal and 
transmits it to the Council, member states make a collective decision about whether to accept 
a new policy and how that policy should look like. The model does not impose any detailed 
restrictions on the precise voting or bargaining protocol that governs interactions in the 
Council. We just assume that the pivotal Council members agree on an outcome that does not 
make them worse off than the status quo and that no other outcome exists that is collectively 
more preferable (i.e. the negotiation outcome is assumed to be individually rational and 
Pareto efficient).8 The type and sequence of moves in the model, as well as possible 
outcomes are illustrated in Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1 about here 
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We assume that the policy space is one-dimensional, distinguishing between more and less 
favourable attitudes towards European integration.9 While the integration dimension might 
have lost in importance in recent years, it has historically been the main dividing line in EU 
politics and continuous to be a major source of conflict today (Hix et al., 2007 p. 177; 
Mattila, 2004 p. 41; Tsebelis and Garrett, 2000 p. 10).10 We denote the current status quo 
policy as SQ and refer to the most preferred policy or ideal point of the Commission by 
COM. The one-dimensionality of the policy space allows us to focus on the two pivotal 
member states: L stands for the ideal point of the least integrationist member state whose 
agreement is required to adopt a Council decision, and M for the ideal point of the most 
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 From a purely theoretical point of view, the assumption about the uni-dimensionality of the issue spaces is not 
consequential. The Commission will introduce a proposal whenever the intersection between the Commission’s 
winset, the collective winset of the pivotal Council members, and the core of the pivotal Council members is 
non-empty, and refrain from introducing a proposal if the intersection is empty. However, without being able to 
specify the number and content of those multiple dimensions, such abstract predictions do not provide testable 
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 The logic of the model does not depend on specific assumptions about the content of the issue dimension. 
While the European integration dimension has been a major dividing line historically, recent studies have also 
found some evidence for the relevance of the left-right dimension in Council decision-making (Hagemann and 
Høyland, 2010; Mattila, 2004). Thus, in the empirical analysis, we investigate a possible effect on proposal 
submissions by changes in the left-right dimension as well. However, focusing on the integration dimension has 
the advantage that we can make reasonable assumptions about the policy position of the Commission, which in 
turn is necessary to derive precise predictions that can be tested empirically. As we cannot make such 
assumptions about the Commission’s position on the left-right dimension and no valid measures exist either, 
such predictions are not possible for this dimension. In either way, if the integration dimension does not capture 
a substantial part of the political conflict in the EU, the empirical analysis will simply reject the integration 
hypothesis. At the same time, support for the integration hypothesis does not imply that other considerations, 
like disagreement on the left-right dimension, do not play a role in the Commission’s decision to introduce a 
new proposal. 
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integrationist member state. In the case of unanimity rule, L and M are simple the ideal points 
of the member states with the most extreme policy preferences. In the case of qualified 
majority voting, L is the ideal point of the least integrationist member state whose agreement 
is required to form a qualified majority in favour of a more integrationist policy, and M is the 
ideal point of the most integrationist member state whose agreement is required to form a 
qualified majority in favour of less integration. 
While we allow member state preferences to take on any value on the integration 
dimension, we require the Commission to prefer a policy that is more integrationist than the 
status quo. In addition, if all member states prefer a more integrationist policy than the policy 
currently in force, we require the Commission to prefer any policy that is acceptable to L over 
the status quo. Both restrictions rule out implausible preference configurations. The first 
restriction rules out that the Commission prefers a lower level of integration than currently in 
force. The second restriction rules out that the Commission has incentives to refuse 
introducing a proposal because the Council decision-making outcome would be more 
integrationist than what was acceptable to the Commission. Unlike Tsebelis and Garrett 
(2000p. 15) in their supranationalist scenario, we do not assume that the Commission is 
always the most integrationist actor. However, we think it is reasonable to assume that the 
Commission will not intentionally block increases in the degree of integration. We further 
assume that all actors have complete information. This assumption implies that they know 
their own and each other’s policy preferences, as well as the sequence of moves of the 
interaction. 
Based on these assumptions, we can solve the game by backward induction. A few 
definitions make the exposition easier. First, we can define an actor’s winset as the set of 
policies preferred by the actor to the status quo. We assume that actors have a symmetric 
utility function and denote actor A’s indifference point as i(A). Second, we can define the 
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Council’s Pareto set as the set of policies such that no policy outside the set exists that makes 
all member states better off. In the one-dimensional scenario employed here, the Pareto set is 
delimited by the ideal points of the two pivotal Council members L and M. Third, we can 
define the negotiation set as the set of policies lying in the intersection of the Pareto set and 
the winset of the member state with an ideal point closest to the status quo. As discussed 
earlier, we assume that any negotiation outcome must be individually rational (i.e. lie within 
the pivotal actor’s winset) and collectively efficient (i.e. lie within the Pareto set). Thus, the 
negotiation set indicates the set of possible negotiation outcomes in the Council. Finally, the 
feasible set indicates the range of feasible policy outcomes. It is defined by the intersection of 
the Commission’s winset and the negotiation set. The Commission will only introduce a 
proposal if the final outcome will make it better off than the status quo. Thus, any policy 
outcome must not only lie within the negotiation set of Council members, but also within the 
winset of the Commission. 
In the last stage of the game, the members of the Council decide whether they can agree 
on policy change. They will be able to do so if the Council’s Pareto set does not include the 
status quo. If the Pareto set includes the status quo, the majority or unanimity agreement 
required to change policy does not exist. When the Commission knows that its proposal will 
be blocked in the Council, it has no incentive to introduce a proposal in the first stage of the 
game.11 This Council gridlock scenario is depicted in Panel A of Figure 2. If the Pareto set 
does not include the status quo, both pivotal member states prefer a new policy over the 
status quo. The new policy will then be located somewhere in the intersection of the 
Council’s Pareto set and the winset of the pivotal member state with an ideal point closest to 
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the status quo. The Commission’s decision in the first stage of the game depends on which 
side of the status quo the Council’s Pareto set lies. If both pivotal Council members prefer a 
less integrationist policy over the status quo, the Commission will again not introduce a 
proposal. The outcome resulting from negotiations among member states would make it 
worse off than the current policy in place. This anti-integrationist Council scenario is 
illustrated in Panel B of Figure 2. The Commission will only introduce a proposal when both 
pivotal member states prefer a more integrationist policy over the status quo. Panel C in 
Figure 2 pictures a situation in which the pivotal Council members agree on such a more 
integrationist policy. 
 
Figure 2 about here 
 
From the scenarios illustrated in Figure 2, deriving a hypothesis about the effect of member 
state preferences on the Commission’s agenda-setting activity is straightforward. In order to 
turn a gridlocked Council into an integrationist Council, the less-integrationist pivot and all 
member states with ideal points that are more integrationist but still less integrationist than 
the status quo have to become more favourably disposed towards European integration. In the 
case of an anti-integrationist Council, both pivots and all member states with ideal points 
located between the pivotal member states’ ideal points have to change their preferences 
towards favouring more integrationist policies.  
 
From a decision-level model to aggregate trends in the volume of Commission proposals 
On the basis of the formal theoretical model sketched above we can derived a hypothesis 
about the conditions under which the Commission will or will not introduce a proposal. Since 
non-decisions are not observable, it is very difficult to test such hypotheses directly.  The 
10 
 
insights of the model, however, have implications about the aggregate level time trends of the 
total number of proposals: implications which can be tested.  
 
Figure 3 about here 
 
How does the decision-level model translate into observable aggregate-level behaviour? In 
short, when the Commission faces a more EU-supportive pivot in the Council, there is a 
larger number of proposals it can introduce that will get the support of the Council. Figure 3 
illustrates the logic of this proposition. Similar to the setup of the decision-level model, the 
horizontal line stands for the European integration dimension on which the Commission 
(COM) and two actors pivotal in two separate time periods (L1 and L2) have ideal points. The 
origin of the line is at the point of ‘No integration’. The dotted curved line represents a 
distribution12 of status quo positions for the current set of policy issues: most of them are 
clustered towards the ‘less integration’ end of the scale, meaning that the current situation is 
one of little European co-operation on the issue.  In the first time period the Commission 
faces a rather Eurosceptic pivot in the Council (L1). Area A contains all policies that can be 
amended (the European integration dimension can be strengthened) with the support of the 
Council pivotal member under QMV. Any proposals to bring a policy that is already to the 
right of L1 even further towards the position of the Commission will be defeated, and 
therefore the Commission will never introduce the proposals in the first place. What happens 
when a new more integration-friendly pivot L2 replaces L1 in period 2 (e.g., after elections in 
any of the member states)? In addition to all proposals under area A, now the Commission 
can improve on the policies in area B as well. There is a larger range of policy issues on 
                                               
12
 The exact functional form of the distribution does not matter for the direction of the effect of the pivot’s 
position on the number of proposals: it only matters for the magnitude of the effect.  
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which the Council can agree to amend the status quo in a more integrationist direction. 
Hence, the volume of proposals made by the Commission in the second time period will be 
greater.  
The model outlined above made a number of simplifying assumptions about the EU 
legislative process in order to clearly explicate the basic logic underlying the theoretical 
argument. In particular, it has neglected the European Parliament. For much of the period 
considered here, the Parliament only had a consultative function. In fact, about 80 percent of 
all proposals in our sample were introduced under the consultation procedure. Until the entry 
into force of the Single European Act in 1987, the Parliament did not have any strong 
legislative powers; and even by the end of the study period in 2003, the proportion of 
proposals introduced under the consultation procedure still accounted for about 60 percent of 
all proposals. Nevertheless, the role of the EP increased considerably over time and cannot be 
ignored. Theoretically, the EP can easily be incorporated as an additional veto player into the 
model. Intuitively, the inclusion of the EP does not have an effect on the model’s predictions 
in situations in which the Commission faces a gridlocked or an anti-integrationist Council. In 
both cases, the preference configuration of member states is already sufficient to prevent the 
Commission from introducing a proposal.  
The only situation in which the EP really matters for the Commission’s decision to 
introduce or not introduce a proposal is when the Commission faces an integrationist Council. 
Only considering the preferences of the Council, the Commission would usually introduce a 
proposal. However, if the EP is a veto player and has anti-integrationist preferences, then the 
inter-institutional pareto set will include the status quo and there will be no overlap in the 
winsets of the Parliament on the one hand and the winsets of the Council members and the 
Commission on the other hand. Therefore, the Commission is less likely to introduce a 
proposal when the EP has substantial law-making powers than when the EP is only consulted 
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during the legislative procedure. Again, our main hypothesis is robust to the inclusion of the 
EP in the model. Keeping the ideal point of the EP constant, a move of member states 
towards more integrationist attitudes will either not change the prediction of the model or 
lead the Commission to introduce a proposal where it would not have introduced one before. 
Nevertheless, the empirical analysis controls for effects of changes in the powers of the EP, 
as well as any other constitutional changes over time that result from different treaty reforms. 
Operationalization and measurement 
The research strategy we adopt for testing the hypothesis derived in the previous section is a 
diachronical analysis of aggregated Commission activity over the period 1976 to 2003. As 
explained above, the constraining effect of Council preferences should be visible in the 
aggregate proposal output. This section provides details on the operationalization and 
measurement of the variables used in the analysis.  
We operationalise the Commissions’ agenda-setting activity using the number of 
directives proposed by the Commission in each semester. We opt for the semester as the unit 
of analysis because decision making in the EU follows the rhythm of the meetings of the 
rotating Council Presidency. Although the individual Council configurations and the working 
parties attached to them have meetings throughout the year, June and December are the 
months in which most legislative decisions are adopted, modified or abandoned (Toshkov, 
2009). In principle, the data that we employ allows for an even finer disaggregation into 
months or even weeks, but our independent variables change rather slowly over time and 
some of our variables are only measured twice a year. Therefore, the semester emerges as the 
natural unit of analysis for the purposes of our study.  
We focus only on proposals for directives because the other two types of binding EU 
legislative acts – regulations and decisions – either have a limited scope of application and/or 
deal mostly with routine issues (Golub, 1999 p. 738). Of course, there are important 
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regulations and decisions with far-reaching consequences. We have no clear criteria, 
however, to single out the few important ones from the thousands of trivial regulations and 
decisions proposed each year. In addition, the bulk of EU regulations concern the agricultural 
policy sector, which would skew our sample if we were to include those. We obtain data on 
the number of proposals from the Prelex database. Prelex is the EU database of inter-
institutional procedures and tracks the main stages in the legislative process in the EU13. It is 
managed by the Commission itself and provides a record of its legislative proposals for the 
period 1976 to 2005. We used automated data extraction software to collect the individual 
records, which is a more reliable method than using the built-in search facilities of the 
database. 
Having described the operationalization and measurement of our dependent variable, 
we turn towards a discussion of our main independent variable, Council EU support. We 
operationalise Council EU support by the EU position of the pivotal Council member under 
QMV14. First, for each semester, we identified the EU positions of the governments of the 
member states and their voting share under the existing rules. Second, we ordered these 
positions from the least to the most EU-friendly, and we identified the pivotal member state 
whose agreement was necessary for an integrationist policy proposal to be adopted under the 
existing QMV rules. For example, in the second part of 1984, the least EU-supportive 
governments were Ireland (0), Greece (0.34), Denmark (1.72) and the UK (1.80), and the 
QMV threshold was 45 out of 63 votes (71%). Since Ireland, Greece and Denmark together 
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had 11 votes, they could be outvoted under QMV and the UK’s position (10 votes) was 
pivotal for any proposals that move policy in an integrationist direction.  
Preferences are notoriously difficult to measure and our operationalization choices are 
restricted by the available data.  We faced two options regarding possible data sources for 
government party positions: expert surveys and party manifestos. We opted for the latter 
because of the long time-span of our analysis. While expert surveys provide useful estimates 
of party positions on a range of issues, including European integration, there are no 
systematic surveys of party positions for the period before the late 1990s. If we were to use 
expert survey estimates, we would have had to extrapolate estimates of party positions made 
in 1999 to parties governing in the 1970s and 1980s. For a study that is primarily interested in 
the effects of preference changes over time, such a near-constant preference indicator would 
have been extremely problematic. Moreover, we would have had a large number of missing 
cases in the form of parties and governments for which no measures are available. Thus, we 
measure mean EU support in the Council with the estimates provided by the comparative 
party manifestos project, which uses programmatic party statements to capture the attitudes 
of parties on a variety of issues (Klingermann et al., 2007). 
The EU support variable based on this data source tracks the number of positive 
statements about European integration that parties make minus the number of negative 
statements. An advantage of this measure is that it varies not only between parties but also for 
the same party over time. Each national government score is calculated as the weighted mean 
of the positions of the government parties, where the weights represent the proportion of 
parliamentary seats held by each party.  
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In addition to the main explanatory variable Council EU support, we measure and 
include public EU support in the analysis as a potential confounding variable. Public support 
is related to the amount of legislation adopted in the EU over time (Toshkov, 2009), and thus 
potentially to the number of Commission proposals as well. Furthermore, it is likely that elite 
and societal support of the EU move hand in hand, even if it might be unclear who leads and 
who follows. Therefore public support for the EU emerges as a potential confounding 
variable, which, if not included in the model, can bias inferences about the relationship 
between Council EU support and the Commission’s legislative agenda-setting activity over 
time. We measure public EU support with data on the proportion of positive answers to the 
corresponding question provided twice a year by Eurobarometer17. Furthermore, we employ a 
number of dummy variables to control for changes in the constitutional setup of the EU, for 
seasonal effects, and for features of the Commission’s ‘lifecycle’.  
 
The impact of EU support on the number of Commission proposals 
We start the analysis with a presentation of the features of the outcome variable, the number 
of proposals for directives tabled by the Commission in each semester from the beginning of 
1976 until the end of 2005. The top panel of Figure 4 tracks the movement of this variable 
over time. We can see that the time series is quite jittery with big variation from one semester 
to the next. The 11-point moving average superimposed on the graph shows evidence for a 
weak, increasing trend in the number of proposals between circa 1984 and 1990, but the trend 
reverses afterwards. The period of intensified activity corresponds with the initiative for 
completing the Single Market during the Commissions presided by Jacques Delors. What is 
surprising is that this particular episode in the history of the European Union has not 
produced an even more marked increase in the number of Commission proposals. 
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Figure 4 about here 
 
The top panel of Figure 5 presents the distribution of the number of proposals. The variable 
has a mean of 26.4 with a standard deviation of 8.9 and a variance of 78.7, and ranges 
between 7 and 56 proposals per semester. Periods of exceptionally low and high numbers of 
proposals are more common than we would expect if the data followed a normal or a Poisson 
distribution. The bottom panel of Figure 5 shows the auto-correlation function (ACF) of the 
number of proposals. The ACF indicates that there is no significant auto-correlation for any 
lags; past values of the series are not correlated with present values. The lack of auto-
correlation is important because it means we do not have to consider the threat of auto-
correlation when building the statistical model. The lack of evidence for auto-correlation 
implies that we can treat the number of proposals during a semester as a random variable. 
 
Figure 5 about here 
 
Next, we turn to an exploration of the movements of our main explanatory variables over 
time. The middle panel of Figure 4 represents the value of the pivotal government’s EU 
support in the Council of Ministers per semester over the 28 years between 1976.I and 
2003.II. The overall mean is 1.72 and the standard deviation is 0.83. Following a slow but 
steady growth, the Council’s pivotal EU support value peaks in the late 1980s, after which it 
drops substantially until around 1993. Afterwards, Council EU support rises, only to reverse 
direction again after 2001. The movements of EU public support (bottom panel of Figure 4) 
over time are familiar and have received a lot of scholarly attention. In short, EU public 
support slowly but consistently grows from the late 1970s to reach a maximum of 72% of the 
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EU population in favour of integration in 1992, but the level of support falls steadily 
afterwards to levels slightly below those in the 1970s. 
 
Figure 6 about here 
 
The three panels of Figure 6 show scatterplots of the three variables we have been discussing 
and the corresponding linear regression lines. We can already note that there are positive 
relationships between the number of proposals and Council EU support (top left) and the 
number of proposals and public support (bottom left). The correlation coefficients are 0.38 
and 0.27, respectively. There is also evidence for a relationship between Council and public 
EU support (top right panel: the correlation is 0.34. Still, this confirms our expectation that 
public support might be a confounding variable for the relationship between Council EU 
support and the number of Commission proposals. 
The scatter plots distinguish between observations falling within the period of the push 
for the creation of the single market (1986-1992, shown as squares) and the remaining 
observations before and after that period (shown as triangles). We can see that the bivariate 
relationship between Council EU support and the number of proposals holds for both subsets 
of the data. Thus, the relationship found for the complete time period is not driven by the 
possibly exceptional circumstances related to the completion of the Single Market project. At 
the same time, the relationship between public support and the number of Commission 
proposals seems spurious. The positive association found in the aggregate seems to be driven 
entirely by the fact that in the period 1986 to 1992 both public support for integration and the 
number of proposed directives were high, while both were lower before and after this period. 
It is also interesting to note that while for the period of the completion of the Internal Market 
Council EU support and public EU support are strongly and positively related, the link is 
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reversed and we find a strong negative relationship between government and public EU 
attitudes outside this period. 
Before we turn to a more comprehensive multivariate analysis, we present in detail the 
temporal cycles in the number of Commission proposals adopted. We might suspect a 
seasonal effect in the pattern of Commission proposals: autumn semesters might be more 
productive than the spring semesters. In addition, we expect that the Commission’s lifecycle 
could be responsible for some of the variation in the number of proposals over time. When 
freshly instituted, the new College of Commissioners needs time to gain momentum and 
produce proposals. At the same time, during their last year before their term is over, the 
Commissioners should be especially eager to transform their ideas into legislative proposals. 
Looking at Figure 7 we can confirm these expectations. The figure presents the number of 
proposals adopted by each Commission for each semester of its tenure (solid black dots) and 
in addition indicates the mean values averaged for each semester over all Commissions (the 
smaller grey dots). 
 
Figure 7 about here 
 
We can see that the first semester is in general less productive than the remaining ones. 
Furthermore, it is clear that especially the last two semesters of a Commission’s term are 
increasingly productive. Curiously, the seasonal pattern is quite strong for the first two years 
of a Commission’s term, but weaker for the last years of the cycle. An important message of 
the plots presented in Figure 7 is that the variation of proposals over time within the same 
Commission is comparable to, if not larger than, the variation between Commissions. This 
indicates that there is a substantive amount of short term variation in the number of proposals 
that needs to be accounted for. In addition to the intrinsic insight that it brings, the 
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exploration of the cycles in Commission activity is important for constructing an adequate 
statistical model for the links between Council and public EU support and the number of 
proposals adopted. The cyclical variation can obscure the real effects of our main explanatory 
variables unless it is accounted for. Hence, we use three variables to capture the cyclical 
nature of Commission activity: a seasonal dummy indicating the semester of the year, an 
indicator for the first semester of a new Commission, and an indicator for the last year of an 
outgoing Commission. 
Having explored the developments of our variables over time, we now turn towards 
constructing and developing a parametric statistical model accounting for the variation in the 
number of Commission proposals. As discussed above, a model based on the Normal 
distribution would not be appropriate for the data at hand. Even the Poisson distribution, 
which is in principle suitable for modelling count data, under-estimates the dispersion of 
public proposals in the data, as it forces the mean and the variance to be equal. Hence, we opt 
for the negative binomial specification which allows for over-dispersed data.  
 
Table 1 about here 
 
Table 1 presents the results from the estimations. We report in full five models: the first three 
models have the same set of explanatory variables but different dependent variables (all 
proposals for directives, proposals for new directives only, and proposals for amending 
directives only). Models 4 and 5 use different operationalisations of the main independent 
variable – Council EU support. In all models, all coefficients have the expected sign. While it 
is not possible to report a R2-statistic for negative binomial models, a linear specification of 
Model 1 with the same variables has an adjusted R2 of 0.31. The signs of the coefficients 
show that Council EU support, public EU support, and the indicators for the second semester 
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and the last year of a Commission have a positive influence on the number of proposals 
tabled. The binary variable for the first semester of a new Commission has the expected 
negative effect.  
Because the model is nonlinear, we cannot interpret the regression coefficients 
directly as effect sizes. Instead, we can calculate factor changes in the expected number of 
Commission proposals. For a unit change in EU Council support, the expected number of 
proposals changes by a factor of 1.14. In other words, each additional point on the Council 
EU support scale increases the number of Commission proposals by almost 14%. The 95% 
confidence intervals of this estimate range from 1.04 to 1.25. The effect is comparable to a 
one-standard deviation change in the dependent variable, which is 10 proposals. Some of the 
control variables also have substantial effects. The last year of a Commission is associated 
with a 22% increase in the number of proposals adopted. In contrast, during the first semester 
of a new commission, 30% less proposals are adopted on average. Another way of gaining an 
insight into the estimation results is by calculating the predicted number of Commission 
proposals for a given combination of values on the independent variables. The expected 
number of proposals changes from 32 to 47 over the observed range of the pivotal Council 
EU support when public EU support is set to its mean.  
Models 2 and 3 show that while the effect of Council EU support is even stronger when 
we take the number of proposals for amending legislation only as a dependent variable, it is 
much weaker when we look into the number of proposals for new laws. This findings 
matches well the logic of the theoretical model and its interpretation sketched in Figure 3: in 
times when the pivotal government is more EU-supportive, the Commission can not only 
introduce proposals to ‘communitarize’ policies which previously have been the exclusive 
domain of national governments, but it can also amend in a more integrationist direction 
policies which have already been integrated to some degree (zone B from Figure 3).  
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Models 4 and 5 use different operationalisations of the main independent variable – 
Council EU support. In model 4 Council support is calculated as the weighted (by vote share) 
average of all the governments to the right of the pivot (and including the pivot). In model 5 
the weighted average of all government position is used instead. Both models lead to only 
minor changes – under the alternative specifications, Council EU support remains positively 
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and significantly associated with the number of proposals that the Commission introduced 
over time19. 
Conclusions 
A major issue in the study of European integration concerns the relative power of 
supranational institutions and national governments in steering and shaping this process. In 
particular, the influence of the European Commission is subject to much debate. While neo-
functionalist and institutionialist scholars might agree with intergovernmentalists that 
member states are largely in charge of constitutional changes implemented through reforms 
of the EU treaties (Wallace et al., 1999 pp. 162, 5), they would assert that the Commission 
exerts much influence on the integration process through its formal powers and other 
resources in day-to-day decision-making of the EU (Sandholtz and Stone Sweet, 1998; Stone 
Sweet and Brunell, 1998; Tsebelis and Garrett, 2001). The Commission’s exclusive right of 
initiative is widely seen as one of its major assets to promote and shape the European 
integration process. The Commission seems to be able to mould policy to its liking by 
                                               
19
 Although the plot in Figure 5 did not suggest any significant auto-correlations, we re-estimated the model 
with the lagged number of proposals as an independent variable, but the results did not change significantly. We 
also estimated the model lagging the dependent variable: the coefficient of Council EU support dropped in value 
but remained positive and marginally significant (p=0.096). We also estimated a model in which we included 
dummy variables for the different Treaty regimes and a model with a dummy for the Single Market program 
period: the coefficient of Council EU support remained in the expected direction but the effect dropped to 0.08. 
A model in which the weighted average left/right position in the Council was included returned a positive and 
statistically significant result for Council EU support and a positive but not significant result for the left/right 
position. Removing an outlying observation, which seemed to have a disproportionally big influence on the 
estimated coefficients, did not result in substantial changes in the estimated effects and their significance. 
Lastly, we tested whether there is a significant interaction between Council and public EU support but found no 
supporting evidence. 
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framing the problem in a favourable way or by exploiting the possibility to satisfy competing 
qualified majority coalitions in the Council. However, these studies neglect what Bachrach 
and Baratz have called the second face of power (Bachrach and Baratz, 1962). When it comes 
to agenda-setting setting power, the power to determine whether or not an issue is going to be 
on the agenda logically precedes the power to influence the final decision-making outcome. 
The study of actual decision-making cases is not able to uncover this more hidden form of 
power and an exclusive focus on such cases biases the analysis of influence and power in 
politics. 
While the Commission has the formal and exclusive right to initiate legislation, it 
usually takes the views of member states into account when deciding about whether or not to 
submit a proposal. The very high rate of successful Commission proposals is therefore not a 
result of the Commission’s power to see its policy ideas adopted by member states in the 
Council, but due to the Commission’s foresight in anticipating resistance. Most of the time, 
the Commission does not have an incentive to initiate legislative proposals that it knows will 
be unacceptable to member states. We presented a simple theoretical model to elaborate on 
this selection effect. The model illustrates the conditions under which the Commission will or 
will not introduce a proposal. Under the plausible assumption that the Commission has rather 
integrationist preferences, it abstains from introducing a proposal when it faces a Council that 
favours a less integrationist policy than the status quo or if it faces a gridlocked Council that 
is divided about the future course of integration. Anticipating member states’ views, the 
Commission only introduces a proposal that it expects to be acceptable to the Council and 
that it expects to result in an increase in the level of integration. 
We tested this hypothesis with data on the aggregate agenda-setting activity of the 
Commission and overall EU support in the Council between 1976 and 2003. While individual 
non-decisions are hard or even impossible to observe and study, the anticipation effect is 
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visible on the aggregate level: changes in the aggregate Commission output over time are 
associated with changes in the level of EU support in the Council. This association remained 
robust even after controlling for EU public support, changes in the constitutional framework, 
seasonal effects, and features of the Commission’s life cycle. Thus, the results of the 
empirical analysis support the anticipation hypothesis.  
While robust, the relationship is moderate in size, and there is a substantial degree of 
variation that is not captured by the model. Problems regarding the measurement of EU 
support in the Council might be to blame for the lack of a stronger association. The 
government positions estimated from party manifestos are for now the only option 
researchers have to systematically compare party positions over extended periods of time and 
across EU governments. Recent advances in automated text analysis might allow for the 
construction of improved measures that are based on a wider selection of documents and 
represent the underlying positions of parties and governments in a more valid and reliable 
manner. The results presented in this paper will certainly benefit from future replications 
based on new measures of Council EU support. Still, the fact that the analysis revealed the 
expected association despite these measurement problems gives us confidence in the validity 
of the theoretical argument. 
In general, the complex relationships between elite and public preferences and 
Commission activity present an interesting view of the dynamic links between mass attitudes, 
government positions, and policy output in the EU. Understanding the temporal dynamics of 
the European polity is an important, albeit somewhat neglected area of European integration 
research. Recent studies have suggested that the overall legislative productivity of the EU 
responds to shifts in public EU support, that government EU support might be higher after 
periods of worse economic conditions, especially high unemployment (Toshkov, 2009), and 
that public and elite EU preferences interact in complex ways (Carrubba, 2001; Hellstrom, 
25 
 
2008). The present paper has illuminated another piece of the puzzle by discovering that the 
Commission’s agenda-setting activity is constrained by the degree of EU support in the 
Council. Building a fuller picture incorporating all these links in a comprehensive theory is a 
task that should be addressed in future research, if we are to understand the dynamic interplay 
of forces shaping the process of European integration. 
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Fig. 1. Sequence of moves in the Commission proposal initiation model. In the last 
stage, the Council rejects the proposal if the status quo lies within the pivotal 
member states’ Pareto set and negotiates a new policy otherwise. Anticipating the 
decision of the Council, the Commission introduces a proposal in the first stage if 
the Council is not gridlocked and if it prefers the new policy negotiated by the 
Council to the status quo.  
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Fig. 2. Commission’s agenda-setting activity as a function of Council preferences. 
Panel A: The Commission does not introduce a proposal because a change in either 
direction from the status quo would be vetoed by at least one pivotal member state. 
Panel B: The Commission does not introduce a proposal because the Council 
amendments would reduce the level of integration. Panel C: The Commission 
introduces a proposal because the Council will agree to a more integrationist policy.  
M COM L SQ 
M COM L SQ 
Commission winset 
Council’s Pareto set 
Commission winset 
Negotiation set (empty) 
Negotiation set 
A. Gridlocked Council: Commission does not introduce proposal 
C. Integrationist Council: Commission introduces proposal 
L’s winset 
L’s winset 
i(L) 
i(L) 
i(COM) 
i(COM) 
Council’s Pareto set 
L COM M SQ 
Commission winset 
Negotiation set 
B. Anti-integrationist Council: Commission does not introduce proposal 
M’s winset 
i(M) i(COM) 
Council’s Pareto set 
Feasible set (empty) 
Feasible set 
More 
integration 
More 
integration 
More 
integration 
Feasible set (empty) 
31 
 
 
 
Fig.3. The number of proposals made by the Commission facing two Council pivots 
L1 and L2 differs. The curved line represents a distribution of the status quo 
positions for a set of policies. Facing L1, the Commission can amend only proposals 
in area A. When L2 becomes the pivot in the Council, amendments to policies in area 
B also become feasible.  
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Number of Commission proposals over time
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Fig. 4. Changes in variables over time. Top panel: the number of Commission 
proposals for directives per semester from 1976.I to 2005.II. An 11-point rolling 
mean is added. Middle panel: pivotal member’s EU support in the Council of 
Ministers. Bottom panel: public support for the EU. Sources: Own calculations 
based on data derived from Prelex (number of proposals), Eurobarometer (public 
EU support), and Comparative Party Manifestos Project (Council EU support). 
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Fig. 5. Commission agenda-setting activity. Top  panel: histogram of the distribution 
of the number of proposals. Bottom panel: auto-correlation function for the same 
variable. Source: Own data derived from Prelex. 
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Fig. 6. Bivariate analysis. Scatter plots of the number of Commission proposals vs. 
the Council’s pivotal member’s EU support (top left), the number of Commission 
proposals vs. public EU support (bottom left), and public EU support vs. Council EU 
support (top right). Observations that fall within the Single Market programme 
(1986-1992) are shown as squares, while the others are represented by triangles. 
The solid lines present linear regression fits for the entire sample. The dashed lines 
are linear fits to the observations from the Single Market period only, while the 
dotted lines are the liner fits to the data excluding the Single Market period. 
Sources: Own calculations based on data derived from Prelex (number of 
proposals), Eurobarometer (public EU support), and Comparative Party Manifestos 
Project (Council EU support). 
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Fig. 7. The number of proposals during the lifetime of individual Commissions 
(labelled by the name of their Presidents). The solid black dots represent the actual 
number of proposals adopted in each consecutive semester of the life of the 
Commission. The smaller grey dots represent the mean number of proposals adopted 
in the respective semester averaged over all Commissions. The solid grey line shows 
the overall mean of proposals adopted over the period 1976.I to 2005.II, while the 
dotted grey line shows the mean of proposals adopted during a specific Commission. 
The caretaker Commission led by Marin is not included because of its short tenure. 
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TABLE 1 Explaining the number of adopted Commission proposals 
 Models 1-3 Model 2 Model 3 
 
DV-  
all laws 
DV –      
new laws 
DV – 
 amend. laws 
DV-  
all laws 
DV-  
all laws 
Variable Coeff. 
(st. error) 
Coeff. 
(st. error) 
Coeff. 
(st. error) 
Coeff. 
(st. error) 
Coeff. 
(st. error) 
Intercept 2.73 
(0.32)*** 
0.92 
(0.49) 
3.21 
(0.42)*** 
2.43 
(0.30)*** 
2.33 
(0.30)*** 
Council Pivot EU support 0.13 
(0.05)** 
0.07  
(0.07) 
0.19 
(0.06)** - - 
Pivot Plus weighted 
average EU support - - - 
0.15 
(0.04)*** - 
All governments weighted 
average EU support - - - - 
0.15 
(0.04)*** 
Public EU support 0.01 
(0.00) 
0.03 
(0.01)** 
-0.02 
(0.01)* 
0.01 
(0.01) 
0.01 
(0.01) 
Semester (baseline=’I’) 0.13 
(0.08) 
0.09 
(0.12) 
0.18 
(0.10) 
0.12 
(0.07) 
0.13 
(0.07) 
1st semester of a new Com. -0.26 
(0.12)* 
-0.37 
(0.18)* 
-0.16 
(0.14) 
-0.27 
(0.11)* 
-0.26 
(0.11)* 
Last year of a Commission 0.20 
(0.08)* 
0.36 
(0.12)** 
0.02 
(0.11) 
0.25 
(0.08)** 
0.28 
(0.08)*** 
 N=56 N=56 N=56 N=56 N=60 
 
Notes. Significance levels: *** p < 0.001 ** p < 0.01 * p < 0.05. 
 
 
 
